Climate Policy Under Uncertainty: A Case for Solar Geoengineering by Moreno-Cruz, Juan & Keith, David W.








Georgia Institute of Technology
221 Bobby Dodd Way
Atlanta, GA 30332–0615
∗ This work was supported by the center for Climate and Energy Decision Making (SES-
0949710), through a cooperative agreement between the National Science Foundation and
Carnegie Mellon University.
c© by Moreno-Cruz and Keith. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including
c© notice, is given to the source.
Mitigation and the Geoengineering Threat
Juan Moreno-Cruz and David W. Keith




Solar Radiation Management (SRM) has two characteristics that make it an attractive
means for managing climate risk: it is quick and it is cheap. SRM cannot, however, exactly
offset CO2-driven climate change, and its use introduces novel climate and environmental
risks. We introduce SRM in a simple economic model of climate change that is designed
to explore the interaction between uncertainty in both the climates response to CO2 and
the risks of SRM. We find that the fact that SRM can be implemented quickly makes it a
valuable tool to manage climate risks, even if it is relatively ineffective at compensating
for CO2-driven climate change or if its costs are large compared to traditional abatement
strategies. Uncertainty about SRM is high, and decision makers must decide whether or not
to commit to research that might reduce this uncertainty. We find that even modest reduc-
tions in uncertainty about the side-effects of SRM can reduce the overall costs of climate
change in the order of 10%.
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Abstract
Solar Radiation Management (SRM) has two characteristics that make it an attractive
means for managing climate risk: it is quick and it is cheap. SRM cannot, however, exactly off-
set CO2-driven climate change, and its use introduces novel climate and environmental risks.
We introduce SRM in a simple economic model of climate change that is designed to explore
the interaction between uncertainty in both the climate’s response to CO2 and the risks of SRM.
We find that the fact that SRM can be implemented quickly makes it a valuable tool to manage
climate risks, even if it is relatively ineffective at compensating for CO2-driven climate change
or if its costs are large compared to traditional abatement strategies. Uncertainty about SRM is
high, and decision makers must decide whether or not to commit to research that might reduce
this uncertainty. We find that even modest reductions in uncertainty about the side-effects of
SRM can reduce the overall costs of climate change in the order of 10%.
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1 Introduction
It appears to be technically feasible to engineer an increase in albedo, a planetary brightening,
as a means to offset the warming caused by carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases
through Solar Radiation Management (SRM) (Keith and Dowlatabadi 1992, Keith 2000, Crutzen
2006, Shepherd et.al. 2009). However, the cooling produced by SRM does not exactly compensate
for the warming caused by CO2-driven climate change; and any particular method of SRM will no
doubt entail other risks and side-effects (e.g. Bala et. al. (2008), Ricke et.al. (2010)). Nevertheless,
SRM may be a useful tool to mange climate risks (Wigley 2006). In this paper we ask: What is
the optimal climate policy when SRM is available? In particular, we ask how optimal policy is
affected by risk regarding the side-effects of SRM, in the face of uncertainty about the magnitude
of the damages caused by CO2-driven climate change.
To answer this question we consider a simple model that captures the following stylized facts
about climate change and SRM:
1. The carbon-climate system has inertia. There is a lag between the response of the climate
system and the anthropogenic carbon emissions that cause climate change. The inertia of
the carbon-climate system makes it impossible to quickly reduce climate risk by reducing
emissions, as it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the
atmosphere 1000 years after the peak is reached (Solomon et. al. 2009).
2. Climate change damages are uncertain. The amount of climate change resulting from a
given emissions trajectory is uncertain, as are the resulting economic (or other) damages.
Moreover, this uncertainty is irreducible over a timescale of decades during which we will
make near-term decisions about emissions abatement (Morgan and Keith, 1995 and Zickfeld
et.al. 2010).
3. SRM is fast. A reduction in the incoming radiation has relatively instantaneous effects on
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global temperature (Caldeira and Matthews 2007, Robock et.al. 2008). Nature gives an
example of how quickly temperature responds to changes in radiative forcing: after Mount
Pinatubo’s explosion around 20TgS were deposited in the stratosphere, global surface tem-
peratures cooled about 0.5oC over the following year (Soden et. al. 2002 ).
4. SRM is inexpensive. At this stage, little is known about the technical costs of SRM, but some
preliminary studies have suggested that SRM could offset the increase in global average
temperature due to CO2 at a cost 10 to 1000 times lower than achieving the same outcome
by cutting emissions (McClellan et al., 2010, Robock et al. 2009, Shepherd et al. 2009).
5. SRM cannot eliminate carbon-climate risk. SRM technologies can intervene to restore the
surface temperature by reducing the incoming solar radiation. This intervention, however,
cannot eliminate all the damages caused by climate change. In particular, the temperature
compensation has a different regional distribution, that leaves the poles under compensated
while the equator is over compensated (Caldeira and Matthews 2007). Moreover, the ac-
cumulation of greenhouse gases has direct implications on the precipitation patterns (Allen
and Ingram, 2002); and, in the case of CO2, ocean acidification (Caldeira and Wickett 2003,
2005).
6. SRM introduces damages. There is an increase in the risks of destruction of stratospheric
ozone due to SRM implementation (Solomon, 1996, 1999). Moreover, sulfuric acid depo-
sition may create health and regional problems (Crutzen, 2006); although recent literature
suggests these effects are small (Kravitz et.al., 2009). Also, recent numerical simulations
show that SRM will affect precipitation patterns and volumes, possibly causing droughts in
large regions of the planet (Ricke et al., 2010).
Our goal is to explore the trade-offs between the advantages and disadvantages of SRM in a
cost minimizing framework. The advantages of SRM to manage climate risks are twofold. First,
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it is inexpensive compared to abatement, and second it allows rapid action avoiding some of the
inertia of the carbon system. The corresponding disadvantages of SRM are that it imperfectly
compensates for CO2 driven warming and it may introduce new environmental risks.
In our model, the objective of the decision-maker is to minimize the expected total costs of
managing climate change. The costs of climate change are the sum of the costs of abatement and
SRM activities plus any economic damages. The costs of abatement and SRM are increasing and
convex functions of their arguments, while economic damages are the sum of the damages arising
from greenhouse gas concentrations — such as temperature changes and ocean acidification -
and those arising from the side-effects of SRM. The damages from temperature are a quadratic
function of the change in global surface temperature; which, in turn, is proportional to radiative
forcing. The damages from ocean acidification arise due to the increase of CO2 concentrations
in the oceans; which, in turn, affects marine life and the economic activities associated with it,
i.e. fishing and tourism. The damages arising from the side-effects of SRM are assumed to be a
quadratic function of the total level of SRM. As a simple way to capture climate-carbon inertia we
use a two-stage decision framework in which the abatement decisions are made in the first period
and SRM decisions are made in the second. In between periods, the decision maker learns the
true sensitivity of the climate (Figure 2). Because temperature depends on cumulative emissions,
we assume emissions are irreversible (NAS 2011) and in that sense, only the level of abatement
implemented before learning about the sensitivity of the climate system can help reduce damages
caused by temperature changes and ocean acidification. The climate system, however, responds
quickly to changes in radiative forcing in the form of SRM. This quickness of response allows
SRM to reduce temperature damages after learning about the sensitivity of the climate; hence,
eliminating the inertia associated with other forms of climate intervention and abatement. Damages
take place in the second period, after SRM decisions are made.
The approach in this paper has proven to be useful for the economic analysis of climate change
and we expect it to be equally insightful for the economic analysis of SRM (e.g. Nordhaus (2007),
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Goulder and Mathai (2000)). Five caveats, however, are important for our analysis:
• The optimal policy assumes a centralized decision maker. In practice, many countries will
decide how to implement SRM amongst themselves. The strategic interaction among coun-
tries may lead to under(over)-provision of SRM or under(over)-provision of abatement (see
Millar-Ball 2011 and Moreno-Cruz 2011).
• A centralized decision maker minimizes changes in global mean temperature and other dam-
ages at a global scale. By making this assumption, we eliminate all considerations to re-
gional inequalities that may arise from the implementation of SRM (see Moreno-Cruz et al.
2011 and Ricke et al. 2010 for a detailed treatment of the inequalities introduced by SRM).
Nonetheless, understanding the optimal policy is very important as it serves as a benchmark
towards which all other policies can be compared.
• Because the model is static, we are not able to analyze time dependent optimal policies.
Policies in which SRM is introduced incrementally are a possibility; however, here we con-
centrate on SRM as a tool to deal with emergencies.
• By considering damages only in terms of reduction in economic output we are neglecting
other aspects of the problem, e.g. changes in the quality of life, and the loss of plant and
animal species.
• We assume damages from climate change and damages from SRM are interchangeable. This
assumption, of course, neglects the ethical issues associated with the direct manipulation
of the climate implied by SRM. Although we believe ethical concerns are crucial for the
analysis of SRM, we concentrate on the economic trade-offs that can help inform the ethical
argument.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we introduce and calibrate the model. In
section 3 we introduce uncertainty on the climate system and analyze the role of SRM in dealing
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with high-impact, low-probability outcomes. In section 4, we deal with the uncertainty attached to
the damages from SRM and analyze the value of reducing this uncertainty. We draw conclusions
in section 5.
2 A General Description of the Model
2.1 Temperature, Abatement and SRM
When the concentration of greenhouse gases increases in the atmosphere it alters the balance be-
tween incoming solar radiation and outgoing terrestrial radiation, resulting in an increase in the
mean global temperature of Earth. Radiative forcing describes how the radiation balance is al-
tered by human activity. Radiative forcing, R, is a function of the concentration of CO2 in the
atmosphere, S, relative to the preindustrial level, S0:
R = β ln(S/S0) (1)
where, according to the IPCC (2007), β = 5.35 watts-per-meter-squared [Wm−2]. Abatement,
which we denote by A, refers to measures that reduce the concentration level of CO2 in the atmo-
sphere. In particular, assume that S = SBAU −A, where SBAU is the business as usual concentration
of CO2 in the atmosphere measured in parts per million [ppm].
Changes in mean global temperature, ∆T —measured in oC—are defined as a linear function
of radiative forcing, R:
∆T = λR (2)
where λ is the climate sensitivity parameter with units oC m2/W.
When SRM is introduced in the model, the relation between CO2 concentrations and tem-
perature is altered. We measure SRM, G, in terms of its radiative forcing potential and, since
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temperature change is a linear function of radiative forcing, equation (2) can be written as:











We represent total climate damages as the sum of impacts from three different sources: temper-
ature, SRM and uncompensated CO2 damages (e.g. ocean acidification.) Following Nordhaus
(2008), we assume temperature damages are quadratic. Following Brander et al. (2009), damages
from ocean acidification are also quadratic on the concentration of CO2. We assume that SRM
damages are also a quadratic function of the total level of SRM.1 To be able to compare the differ-
ent sources of impacts, we express damages in terms of reductions in economic output. Thus, total
damages are given by:
D(A,G) = ηS(SBAU −A)2 +ηT λ 2 (∆T (A,G))2 +ηGG2 (4)
where ηS(SBAU − A)2 are the damages caused by ocean acidification and other uncompensated
damages from CO2, ηT λ 2 (∆T (A,G))
2 are damages caused by temperature changes, and ηGG2
are the damages caused by the side-effects of SRM. In equation (4), when A equals SBAU and G
equals zero, damages are zero. However, when A is less that SBAU , damages are always positive,
showing the inability of SRM to perfectly compensate for greenhouse gas driven climate change
(See bottom panel in Figure 1). That is, although technically SRM can reduce temperature changes
to zero, it may do so at the expense of other economic damages.
1There is not evidence of how steep the damages from SRM are. By choosing quadratic damages we are assuming
they have the same weight as other climate related damages.
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2.3 Implementation Costs
We assume that abatement costs are increasing and convex. In particular, following Nordhaus
(2008), we have:
Λ(A) = KAAα (5)
where KA has units [$/ppm] and α = 2.8.
Following Keith and Dowlatabadi (1992) we assume that SRM costs are linear and given by
Γ(G) = KGG (6)
where KG has units [$/(Wm−2)].
Total social costs are the sum of the implementation costs, given by (5) and (6), and the eco-
nomic damages given by (4). The optimal policy consist of the level of abatement and the level of
SRM that minimize total social costs.
2.4 Calibration
We calibrate our model to replicate the main results of the DICE-2007 model (Dynamic Integrated
Model of Climate and the Economy) (Nordhaus 2008). This model analyzes global economic
activity and the damages associated with CO2-induced temperature change. We complete the
information needed for our calibration using data from the IPCC (2007) and publications related
to the costs of SRM. We use the year 2100 as our starting point and the information given below
is, unless otherwise noted, from Nordhaus (2008).
Data to calibrate climate variables:
• Business as usual concentration of CO2: SBAU = 685 ppm.
• Preindustrial concentration of CO2: S0 = 270 ppm.
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• Business as usual radiative forcing: RBAU = 4.98 W/m2
• Business as usual temperature change: TBAU = 4.28oC.
Data to calibrate economic variables:
• If no action to deal with climate change is taken, around 3% of global GDP will be lost in
2100.
• Ocean acidification damages add 10% to the total impacts from climate change (Brander
et.al. 2009).
• Bringing the temperature change in 2100 down by 1oC from its business as usual value will
cost up to 1% of global GDP.
• SRM costs are between 0.1% and 10% of the costs of abatement (McClellan, 2010, Shepherd
et. al. 2009).
We use the year 2100 as our planning horizon because that is a common target in the analysis
of climate change policy. We calibrate costs and damages as percentages of global GDP, when we
report dollar values we assume global GDP to be around $50 trillion per year (World Bank, World
Development Indicators).2
The information above is sufficient to calibrate our model. We begin by calibrating the costs of
abatement. Reducing temperatures by 1oC relative to the business as usual level implies a reduction
in concentrations of 134 ppm, which from equation (5) implies:
KA = 6.8×10−7[%GDP/ppm]
2As suggested by the reviewers, we analyzed the results for different target years, 50 years from now and 150 years.
All the qualitative results are the same.
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To calculate the costs of SRM we assume they are 1% of the costs of abatement.3 Reducing
temperatures by 1oC relative to the business as usual level implies a reduction in radiative forcing
equivalent to 1.16 Wm−2. From equation (6) we obtain:
KG = 5.7×10−4[%GDP/(Wm−2)]
Next, we calibrate economic damages. Damages from temperature in 2100 are equal to DT ≡
0.03GDP = 12ηT T
2
BAU which yields:
ηT = 0.32 [%GDP/oC]
Similarly, damages from ocean acidification are equal to 0.1DT = 12ηS(SBAU − S0)
2 which
yields:
ηS = 1.3×10−6 [%GDP /ppm]
Due to lack of information and the still infant research on the impacts of SRM, we cannot
calibrate ηG, the parameter representing damages of SRM. Below, we carefully analyze the optimal
policy as a function of ηG: in section 3 we treat ηG parametrically and in section 4 we introduce
uncertainty on ηG.
3 Climate Sensitivity Uncertainty:
SRM as Insurance
In this section we analyze the role of SRM in dealing with the uncertainty surrounding the climate’s
response to changes in the atmospheric concentration of CO2. Specifically, we made the climate
3We performed sensitivity analysis on this value and calculated the results when the costs of SRM are equivalent
to 10% and 100% of the costs of abatement. The main qualitative results hold.
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sensitivity parameter, λ , random. We define the random variable λ̃ , to introduce the uncertainty of
the response of the climate system. λ̃ follows a binomial distribution of the form:
λ̃ =
 λH = 2.3 with probability p = 0.1λL = 0.7 with probability 1− p = 0.9. (7)
Notice that the mean of this distribution is λ̂ = 0.86, which is consistent with recent estimates
(IPCC 2007). We choose this distribution of λ̃ to capture the idea of low probability-high impact
events that are characteristic of fat-tail distributions commonly associated to climate sensitivity
[Reo and Baker 2007, Weitzman 2009]. This is of course a simple approximation that allows
us to introduce risk in the climate system without increasing the complexity of the model. The
qualitative results of our paper would remain the same if we introduce a continuous distribution
with fat-tails (e.g. t-student).
As we mentioned in the introduction, to capture climate-carbon inertia, decisions about abate-
ment and SRM are made sequentially. Abatement decisions are made in the first period and SRM
decisions are made in the second period. In between periods, the true climate sensitivity is re-
vealed. Here SRM decisions are made under perfect information, but we will relax this assumption
in section 4.
We introduce the imperfection of SRM parametrically; that is, the optimal level of abatement
and the optimal level of SRM are a function of the magnitude of the side effects of SRM, ηG.
We allow damages from SRM to be higher than those induced by CO2-driven climate change, so
ηG ∈ [0,1.5DT ] where DT = $11.4×1012/(Wm−2). That is, when ηG =DT , reducing temperature
changes to zero using only SRM may create damages just as large as if temperature were equal to
its business as usual level.
The top panel in Figure 1 shows the optimal policy. As expected, SRM is a decreasing function
of ηG while abatement is increasing in ηG. Thus, abatement and SRM are technical substitutes: if
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SRM is costly, then it is optimal to implement more abatement. Also, the optimal level of SRM is
always higher in the high-sensitivity outcome (λ = λH) compared to the low-sensitivity outcome
(λ = λL). This is the result of the assumption that SRM can be chosen after learning about the
climate sensitivity of the system. Moreover, in the case of an unlucky outcome, SRM is used more
than abatement, even if damages from SRM are higher than DT .
The middle panel in Figure 1 shows temperature with and without SRM. We can see that tem-
perature change increases when the damages from SRM increase. Temperature increases because
there is a reduction in the level of SRM that is less than compensated by the increase in abatement
levels; which results from the fact that abatement costs are increasing and convex.
The bottom panel in Figure 1 shows the total costs of managing climate change as a function
of the marginal damages from SRM, ηG. As expected, total costs are higher when damages from
SRM become larger. If SRM was harmless, that is ηG = 0, the savings relative to the case of no
SRM would be around 2% GDP or $1 trillion per year, which is equivalent to a reduction in the
expected costs of climate change close to 85%. If on the other hand, ηG = DT the cost reduction
due to the introduction of SRM is around 1.1%GDP or $550 billion per year, which is equivalent
to a reduction in the expected costs of climate change close to 50%. To illustrate the role that
the uncompensated damages from CO2 play in the model, we set ηS = 0 (orange lines in lower
panel of Figure 1). The difference between the black and orange lines are due to costs such as
ocean acidification that cannot be compensated by SRM even if there are no damages from SRM,
(ηG = 0).
The crucial result is that it is still optimal to implement high levels of SRM even if the marginal
damages from SRM are higher than those of climate change (ηG = 1.5DT ). The signal advantage
of SRM is its quick response: the fact that it can be implemented after the uncertainty about climate
sensitivity is resolved. Even if damages from SRM are substantially high, it is still very valuable
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Figure 1: Optimal Climate Policy. The horizontal axis is the impacts of SRM expressed as a
fraction of the business-as-usual climate damages. For example, when ηG = 0.5DT , the impacts of
SRM are equivalent to 50% of the damages from CO2-driven climate change. The vertical axis is
in units of radiative forcing (Wm−2). The top panel shows the optimal policy measured in terms of
radiative forcing potential (Wm−2). The middle panel presents the temperature change measured
in oC. The solid line shows the results with SRM, and the dashed line shows the results without
SRM. The bottom panel shows the expected costs of implementing the optimal policy as a fraction
of global GDP. The orange lines show the expected total costs with only temperature damages.
The difference between the solid black line and the solid orange line is the fraction of costs that
cannot be compensated using SRM.
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4 Uncertain SRM:
Assessing the Value of Learning about the Side-Effects
In this section we explicitly introduce uncertainty about the damages from SRM. We examine the
effect that reducing this uncertainty has on the optimal policy and the total costs of addressing
climate change. Uncertainty about the risk and the effectiveness of SRM may be reduced by
researching and engaging in the small scale implementation of SRM. We describe the reduction of
uncertainty–achieved by research or otherwise—as learning.
The implications of learning for the optimal policy depends strongly on when learning occurs
in relation to decisions. We treat three distinct scenarios in which learning take place at different
stages of the decision making process (Figure 2). In the first scenario we assume that learning
occurs after abatement and SRM are chosen; we refer to this as No Learning — NL. In the second
we assume that learning occurs before SRM decisions are made, but after abatement is chosen; we
refer to this as second stage learning — 2L. In the third scenario, we assume that learning occurs
before abatement and SRM decisions are made; we refer to this as first stage learning — 1L.
To introduce risk associated with SRM, we treat the damages due to SRM, ηG, as a random




G = DT with probability q = 0.5
ηLG = 0 with probability 1−q = 0.5.
(8)
which has an expected value of 0.5DT . When q = 0.5, we have no information regarding whether
damages from SRM are larger or smaller than those of climate change. In this case, and due to the
linearity of the model imposed by our assumption of quadratic damages, the optimal policy is equal
to the case of no uncertainty when ηG = 0.5DT . This is also true for other probability distributions
that preserve the mean of the original distribution. The linearity of the model with respect to the
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choice of SRM implies that the decision maker is risk neutral. This very important characteristic
allows us to concentrate on the value of learning that reduces uncertainty (Baker, 2005).
We assume that learning increases the spread of the original distribution by skewing the prob-
ability towards one of the two outcomes. Learning is equally likely to show that the damages from
SRM are equal to the damages from climate change, ηG = DT , or to show they are zero, ηG = 0.
That is, learning does not change the expected value of ηG. In the case where, with probability 0.5,





G = DT with probability q
H = 0.5+M
ηLG = 0 with probability 1−qH = 0.5−M.
(9)
where M ∈ [0,0.5] describes the amount of learning that occurs. On the other hand, if learning




G = DT with probability q
L = 0.5−M
ηLG = 0 with probability 1−qL = 0.5+M.
(10)
We present our analysis as a function of M, the amount of learning that occurs. When M = 0
no learning has occurred. Whereas when M = 0.5, learning has fully eliminated uncertainty.
Figure 3 shows the effects of learning on the optimal policy (top panel), the expected costs
of climate change (middle panel), and the net savings or expected value of information (bottom
panel), as functions of the amount of learning, M. First stage learning (1L) is preferred to second
stage learning (2L) for two related reasons. First, it allows better decisions in terms of SRM: SRM
is lower when learning reveals high SRM damages and SRM is higher when learning reveals low
SRM damages. This tendency is accentuated when learning is larger (M→ 0.5). Second, the value
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Figure 2: Timing of events. The figure shows the different scenarios, that vary depending on
whether decisions are made before or after learning that reduces the uncertainty about the SRM
damages is occurs. Decisions are represented by rectangles, while uncertain outcomes are repre-
sented by circles. Learning is represented with red circles. Payoffs are represented by hexagons.
The first schematic shows the timing of decisions when there is no learning (NL scenario). The sec-
ond schematic describes the scenario when learning takes place before SRM decisions are made,
but after abatement decisions are made (2L scenario). The third schematic describes the scenario
when learning takes place before abatement and SRM decisions are made (1L scenario).
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The top panel in Figure 3 also shows that the expected level of abatement does not change
significantly with early (1L) or late (2L) learning compared to the no learning (NL) scenario. This
suggest that, at least for the optimal policy, learning about SRM do not affect the expected value of
abatement. Of course, the realized — as opposed to expected — value of abatement does strongly
depend on the outcome of learning.
5 Conclusions
We explore a simple model in which a decision maker chooses the level of emissions abatement
and SRM that minimizes the costs of climate change in the face of uncertainty about the impacts
of both emissions and SRM. We draw two main conclusions. First, imperfect SRM is an effective
means to manage the uncertainty in the climate response because it can be implemented quickly
after this uncertainty is resolved, providing a tool to manage the inertia in the carbon-climate deci-
sion problem. Without SRM, the existence of high-consequence low-probability climate impacts,
combined with the irreversibility of emissions, may force very high levels of abatement and hence
high costs. In our model, we find that SRM is used in the case of an unlucky (high-impact) out-
come even if the damages from SRM exceed the expected damages from climate change. Under
the same assumption about the damages from SRM, SRM is substantially reduced when climate
impacts are relatively low.
Second, we find that learning about SRM — that is the value of information associated with
reducing the uncertainty about the side-effects of SRM — can reduce the overall costs of climate
change in the order of 10%, depending on the amount of learning. Suppose learning about SRM
reduced the expected cost of climate change by 5%. We can compare these savings, equivalent to
0.05% of world GDP, with the current spending on SRM research which is less than $10 million
per year, or 0.00002% of GDP; though we cannot, of course, conclude that learning will be propor-
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Figure 3: The effects of learning on the optimal levels of abatement and SRM, and its implications
for total costs, as a function of the amount of learning, M. The second stage learning (2L) scenario
is denoted by dashed lines, the first stage learning (1L) scenario is denoted by solid lines, and
the No Learning scenario corresponds to M = 0. The top panel shows the effects of learning on
the expected level of SRM and abatement. The blue line shows the expected level of SRM in the
case where learning reveals that the SRM impacts are worse than expected, while the green line
shows the converse. In red is the expected value of SRM when the probability of learning that the
damages from SRM are larger or smaller than the damages from climate change is 0.5. The purple
lines shows the optimal level of abatement, A. The purple dotted lines show the level of abatement
in the 1L scenario. The middle panel shows the expected costs, with the same convention as the
top panel. The bottom panel shows the total savings. Total savings are the difference between the
total costs of the optimal policy when there is no learning and the corresponding learning scenario.
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about SRM. Moreover, this specific numerical result depends on the calibration of the model and
on the assumptions about the prior probability distribution over the side-effects of SRM.
The model is a highly simplified representation of the problem. The limitations of the model
are the same attached to any model of climate policy that supposes a single decision maker; no
strategic interaction, no asymmetries and therefore, no distributional issues. On the other hand, we
have used a calibration of climate damages and abatement that is widely used and is representative
of results derived in many complex models. Hence, the limitations of the model likely do not affect
its main result; namely, SRM is valuable for managing climate risk, not because of its low cost,
but because it can be implemented quickly if we discover that climate impacts are high, a “climate
emergency.”
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